No to 55
[Not the usual sort of content for this blog, but British politics is moving through extraordinary times at the moment. This is a response to Philip Cowley’s blog post from earlier today.]
Phil’s post raises many interesting questions and there are all sorts of potential issues that will only be worked out when we see the detail.
I’m in favour of fixed term parliaments (of four years), but as I posted on Twitter yesterday, the biggest political problem with the proposal, and the reason why there is so much disquiet, is its jettisoning of the established convention that there is a link between a 51% vote of no confidence and the dissolution of Parliament.
Of course, as with all things in the British constitution, conventions are there to be broken, as they were in 1924 when Labour placed a no confidence amendment to the King’s Speech, leading Baldwin to stand down and MacDonald to take over with a minority government without the holding of a general election. That was slightly different from the normal no confidence scenario, though, because it was essentially about resolving the outcome of the December 1923 general election, held a few weeks earlier. But the overall point is that many, many generations of British politicians have had it in their bloodstream that a lost vote of confidence = dissolution = an election.
Though it’s open to abuse by the executive, there’s a certain democratic purity to the opposition being able to trigger an election on a simple majority basis in a no confidence vote, even in a fixed-term parliament system. These are all old arguments, I know, but they bear being restated.
Deciding who benefits most, the Conservatives or the Lib Dems, from this constitutional “lock-in” much depends on who you read. But it seems certain that there’s one group that will not benefit from the new rule at least in the medium term: the opposition. In this current context, the 55% proposal therefore has a whiff of naked self-interest about it.
Finally, as Phil says, this will be introduced by statute. In the absence of a written constitution with proper mechanisms for legitimising important constitutional changes like this, it sets the precedent that future hung parliaments will be able to legislate different thresholds depending on the specific balance of power between coalition partners at the time.
Better to establish constitutional rules as openly and as legitimately as possible, then let parties interact in the new environment, as has occurred in Scotland and Wales, where there were huge new constitutional settlements ratified by referendums. The 55% proposal gets it the wrong way round: it takes the current parties’ balance of power and establishes a new constitutional rule based upon this.
There’s an interesting post comparing the 55% proposal with the Scottish context here.